Rebellion and Rule under Consular Optics: Changing Ways of Seeing the China-Vietnam Borderlands, 1874–1879 by Davis, Bradley Camp
UC Berkeley
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review
Title
Rebellion and Rule under Consular Optics: Changing Ways of Seeing the China-Vietnam 
Borderlands, 1874–1879
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/15f714kf
Journal
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, 1(11)
ISSN
2158-9674
Author
Davis, Bradley Camp
Publication Date
2014-06-01
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
 
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 11 (June 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-11) 
 
 
 
 
 
Rebellion and Rule under Consular Optics: Changing Ways of Seeing the China-Vietnam 
Borderlands, 1874–1879 
 
Bradley Camp Davis, Eastern Connecticut State University 
 
Abstract 
 
This article contributes to the continuing discussion concerning the changing relationships 
between China and its neighbors in the nineteenth century. Focusing on Vietnam, a country 
within the metaphorical framework of the “tribute system,” it analyzes the complex range of 
relationships in the borderlands during the 1870s. Following the establishment of French 
consular offices in northern Vietnam, rebellions, counterinsurgency, communities, and 
commerce in the borderlands fell under a new kind of official gaze, one that ultimately provided 
self-serving justification to advocates of French imperialism in Southeast Asia. As emblems of 
foreign influence, French consulates soon became elements in factional struggles that unfolded 
within the Vietnamese bureaucracy over the role of China in Vietnam, the employment of 
surrendered bandits as officials, and borderlands administration. 
 
Keywords: borderlands, frontiers, French imperialism, rebellion, Nguyễn Vietnam, French 
Indochina, Qing Empire, Li Yangcai, Alexandre de Kergaradec, Black Flags, Liu Yongfu, 
Yellow Flags, Hoàng Kế Viêm  
 
Introduction 
In the final week of October 1879, Li Yangcai was decapitated in China. A former military 
officer who rebelled against his commanders, Li had proclaimed himself the previous year a 
direct descendant of the founder of the Vietnamese Lý dynasty (1009–1225). Beginning in the 
China-Vietnam borderlands, he launched a rebellion that spread as far south as Thái Nguyên and 
Bắc Ninh, just north of Hanoi (figure 1). Upon his arrest in 1879, Li Yangcai was brought back 
to southern China and executed. His severed head, however, was returned to northern Vietnam. 
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Authorities from the borderlands to Bắc Ninh put it on display as evidence of his rebellion’s 
defeat. 
 
 
Figure 1. China-Vietnam borderlands. Source: Famin (1895, inserted between pp. 4 and 5). 
 
The movement of people within the borderlands between China and Vietnam was nothing 
new; it involved ordinary workers and traders, refugees from war and rebellion, as well as rebels 
such as Li Yangcai. Since at least the first century C.E., this area had been a site of contested 
sovereignties. Although managed through the formal relationship of the states or, at times, 
empires of China and Vietnam, the space between these two countries was often a site for 
negotiation. Despite the institutional existence of the tribute system, whereby Vietnam (or other 
states, such as Korea or the Southeast Asian trading empire of Srivijaya) formally acknowledged 
the regional hegemony of China, events in the borderlands often defied notions of Vietnamese 
acceptance of Chinese civilizational supremacy. As the historian of Vietnam Keith Taylor has 
noted, “There is no such thing as the Sino-Vietnamese relationship as a single, definable model 
of engagement; dynasties and governments have through time entertained a succession of 
relationships that cover the full spectrum between war and amity” (1998, 971). During the 
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nineteenth century, the particular relationship between Nguyễn Vietnam and the Qing Empire 
provided a platform for both cooperative counterinsurgency and, to the frustration of the 
authorities, transborder rebellion. After the mid-nineteenth century, this relationship, as well as 
rebellions such as Li Yangcai’s, transpired under the gaze of a new official institution: the 
French consulate at Hanoi. The French consular view of the official China-Vietnam relationship 
in general and the contested area of the China-Vietnam borderlands in particular supplied a new 
image, one that promoted the redemptive role of French colonial rule and the necessary end of 
the formal tributary relationship between China and Vietnam. 
 In a thought-provoking study of Qing views regarding British India, historian Matthew 
Mosca explains the complex nineteenth-century transition from “frontier policy,” typified by 
fragmentary and localized knowledge, to “foreign policy,” which addressed the concerns of a 
multipolar world (Mosca 2013). In the borderlands of China and Vietnam, officials from both the 
Qing Empire and Vietnam faced a changing political situation. As French consular offices 
gathered information about these borderlands, Qing and Vietnamese officials became the 
subjects of a new way of seeing the space between Vietnam and China, as did migration, 
commerce, rebellion, and cooperative counterinsurgency. The disciplining discourse of “French 
interests” enabled observers to cast borderland events in terms of the failure of the traditional 
relationship between China and Vietnam to provide a framework for governance. Mosca argues 
that a “regionally fragmented outlook” characterized the approach of Qing officials to British 
India throughout the 1830s (Mosca 2013, 164). Concerning Qing relations with the wider world, 
the case of Vietnam in the 1870s provides a picture of change at an intimate level and in a place 
traditionally defined through the flexible institution of “tribute.” 
During the nineteenth century, the shifting international order, as in the case with Qing 
views of India, brought important changes to the China-Vietnam borderlands. Under the French 
consular gaze, the discursive metaphor of the China-Vietnam relationship provided a justification 
for French military intervention. The traditional trope of the ruling elite became an argument for 
European imperialism in Vietnam. The existence of consular offices, particularly in Hanoi, 
facilitated the production of intelligence about the borderlands. This intelligence not only served 
French commercial interests, the defense of which was a central trope of arguments for colonial 
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intervention in northern Vietnam, but also signaled a shift in the competing sovereignties of the 
borderlands themselves. Before the formal establishment of French protectorate rule over Tonkin 
(northern Vietnam) and Annam (central Vietnam), a consular way of seeing the borderlands set 
the frame for an extension of French colonial rule from the colony of Cochinchina to the entirety 
of Nguyễn Vietnam. 
 
The French Consulates of Haiphong and Hanoi 
Established in 1874, the French consulates in Vietnam housed diplomatic officials and 
military. Although technically concerned with the defense of French interests and intended as 
conduits for a commercial agenda, these consulates became intelligence-gathering posts, nodes 
for producing information about Vietnam and its northern borderlands. Through a network of 
contacts, as well as through firsthand investigation, consular officials, particularly in Hanoi, 
collected material for a series of published reports on the commercial possibilities awaiting 
investors and colons-explorateurs in northern Vietnam. They also attempted, through more 
clandestine efforts, to carve out a place for France in the China-Vietnam borderlands. 
The consulates made possible a way of seeing the borderlands that supported French 
colonial intervention. Throughout their intelligence work, consular officials developed several 
core themes: French commercial interests in northern Vietnam were imperiled, Nguyễn authority 
was venal and weak, French interests could be advanced only once reliable allies were found, 
and maps and mineral surveys of northern Vietnam had to take place under the supervision of 
French experts. 
The connection between China and Vietnam, refracted through the consular optics, 
became a justification for French military intervention, an intervention that would arrive in the 
1880s in the form of war between China and France. In the 1870s, prior to the Sino-French War 
(1883–1885), French consulates, as emblems of foreign influence, became elements in factional 
struggles within the Nguyễn bureaucracy over the role of former Chinese rebels in the 
Vietnamese administration. These struggles often exposed rifts over the relationship between 
Nguyễn Vietnam and the Qing Empire. 
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By considering some events contemporary to the consulates, we can appreciate the 
refraction, the interested interpretation that separated the consular view of the borderlands from 
the shared political arrangements of the Chinese and Vietnamese states. While the borderlands 
may seem, through the consular optics, to be a setting for the realization of French commercial 
ambitions, the lively terrain between China and Vietnam contained a much more complex, 
alternatively ordered reality. 
 
The Hanoi Consulate and the Defense of “French Interests” 
The French consulates in Hanoi and Haiphong had histories of their own. Their 
establishment was the direct outcome of the “Garnier affair” of 1873. Francis Garnier, an 
advocate of colonial expansion, was attempting to overthrow Nguyễn authority in the Red River 
Delta when he died in battle at the hands of the Black Flags (C: Heiqijun, V: Quân Cờ Đen), then 
in alliance with the Nguyễn court. 
An armed band led by former Chinese rebels, the Black Flags came to Vietnam from 
southern China in the 1860s. Starting in 1868, the Black Flags received recognition as official 
allies of the Vietnamese state.1 When they defeated Garnier in 1873, they defended both the 
authority of a sovereign Vietnamese state and their own powerful position in northern Vietnam. 
In the aftermath of the Garnier affair, authorities in Paris demanded an expeditious end to 
hostilities with Nguyễn Vietnam (Cady 1954, 287–288; Munholland 1979; Taboulet 1955, 738–
741; Vũ, Phạm, and Nguyễn 2003, 391–392). The 1874 Philastre (or Giáp Tuất) Treaty, signed 
by Paul Philastre, Lê Tuấn, and Nguyễn Văn Tường in Saigon, the capital of French 
Cochinchina, ended the state of hostilities provoked by Garnier. It also included a provision for 
the establishment of French consulates in Hanoi and Haiphong. 
The vague wording of the treaty permitted the consulates to do two things: to sponsor 
commercial expeditions by French citizens in northern Vietnam (Tonkin) and to gather 
information about domestic political events (Lê 2005). The Comte de Kergaradec (Alexandre 
Camille Jules Lejumeau de Kergaradec, 1841–1894), the first head of the Hanoi consulate, 
carried out this double-themed mission (figure 2). A lieutenant de vaisseau, Kergaradec had a 
career in the French navy prior to assuming the head of the consulate (Masson 1933, 272). Upon 
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his appointment, he requested reports from merchants and visited with Paul Puginier, the vicar 
apostolic of Western Tonkin, thus connecting the work of the consulate with commercial and 
religious networks.2 On October 10, 1875, Kergaradec reported to the French colonial 
government in Cochinchina about the precarious condition of French interests in northern 
Vietnam. He identified the ineffectuality of the Nguyễn state and the power of the Black Flags as 
the chief barriers to commerce and trade.3 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Alexandre Camille Jules Lejumeau, Count of Kergaradec. Source: Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France (http://gallica.bnf.fr). 
 
From Hanoi, Kergaradec began to travel around the Red River Delta, making firsthand 
investigations of northern Vietnam. In January 1876, he visited Sơn Tây, a major market and 
political center outside Hanoi. In his reports, he produced a picture of a fractured and uneven 
Vietnamese state. For instance, he met the retired bandit hunter Vũ Trọng Bình, whom he 
described as a powerful senior official with a reputation for honesty and fairness.4 In the same 
report, he also lamented the condition of Lào Cai, a lucrative trade center on the Red River 
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between China and Vietnam (figure 3). The town, he complained, was dominated by the Black 
Flags, despite the fact that it remained, technically, under the rule of Nguyễn Vietnam.5 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Red River at Lào Cai, 1876–1877. Photograph by Émile Gsell. Source: Ghesquière 
(2001, 224). 
 
 Kergaradec’s concern for Lào Cai led him to seek direct negotiations with the Black 
Flags. On March 22, 1876, in response to a request he made through an intermediary, three 
people claiming to represent Liu Yongfu, the leader of the Black Flags, paid a visit to 
Kergaradec at the Hanoi consulate.6 Although the Nguyễn authorities in Hanoi as well as the 
court in Huế would learn about this meeting after the fact, no one from the Black Flags sought 
permission from Vietnamese officials to enter into discussions with the consulate. The delegation 
itself consisted of a lieutenant identified as Hoàng Nhị, a relative of Liu, and a secretary 
(ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:113).7 According to Kergaradec, they posed three questions: (1) Does France 
seek revenge for the death of Francis Garnier? (2) Does France intend to take Lào Cai by force? 
and (3) Will France entertain an offer to purchase the river port from the Black Flags? The 
envoys presented financial compensation as the only way to induce the Black Flags to leave Lào 
Cai, thus dislodging what Kergaradec viewed as a significant obstacle to commerce along the 
Red River.8 
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During this meeting, Kergaradec placated the Black Flags’ concerns over French military 
action while attempting to secure their assistance. No one, Kergaradec assured the delegation, 
would seek revenge for the death of Garnier. Nor would anyone, acting on behalf of France, 
attempt to take Lào Cai from the Black Flags by force or by purchase. However, Kergaradec 
requested a guarantee that French merchants be permitted to pass through the area in peace.9 In 
response, the Black Flag delegation advised him that any exploratory journeys up the Red River 
into their territory must include a small security force provided by the consulate, refusing to 
promise safety in the vicinity of Lào Cai.10 
Kergaradec himself made such a journey soon after this clandestine meeting. In 
November 1876, he assembled a group of twenty, including a photographer named Émile Gsell, 
and led them from Hanoi to Sơn Tây to meet an official Nguyễn escort.11 Although ostensibly 
surveying the commercial potential of the area, the consular expedition kept detailed records of 
the system of customs fees along the Red River, from Sơn Tây to Hưng Hóa town. Salt, for 
instance, a government monopoly good, attracted a 3 percent to 10 percent duty from Nguyễn 
authorities in Hưng Hóa. One hundred piculs of salt, valued at 320 quan, brought in 32 quan in 
fees for the local government, fees that contributed to the costs, broadly understood, of 
transporting the salt to market (Kergaradec 1877, 324). Kergaradec also observed that annual 
fees paid by customs posts to the provincial government placed an additional burden (valued by 
him at 150,000 francs) on the salt trade (1877, 328). 
The expedition recorded that customs posts in Black Flag territory farther to the north 
demanded a much higher duty. In Bảo Hà, a market center along the Red River, Kergaradec 
learned that posts charged a 60 percent duty on salt, six times the government rate and payable 
either in silver, opium, tea, or tin. The post in Bảo Hà also assessed additional fees of seemingly 
arbitrary category, including transport fees, inspection fees, and permission to sell fees 
(Kergaradec 1877, 344). Although he only briefly visited Lào Cai, Kergaradec valued customs 
duties collected there by the Black Flags at over 90,000 francs per year (1877, 351). 
Kergaradec also developed an understanding of the political situation in the borderlands 
that cast uplands populations as potential allies to French interests. According to the expedition’s 
report, Vietnamese officials in Lào Cai relayed a message from the leader of the Black Flags that 
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outlined the proper conduct for foreign visitors (Kergaradec 1877, 345–346). With local 
officialdom working as couriers for the Black Flags, Kergaradec commented that their powerful 
leader, Liu Yongfu, was “an ignorant, unyielding, and mistrustful bandit who has lived by raping 
the mountains for these past twenty years” (1877, 345–346) (figure 4). He portrayed the Black 
Flags as the enemy of uplands populations (1877, 341–342). He also hoped to use his personal 
connection with the Black Flags, from their secret meeting in Hanoi, to create a fatal schism in 
Liu’s organization (1877, 341–342). For Kergaradec, a weakened Black Flag Army would 
remove a barrier to commercial development while ensuring a positive role for a French presence 
as defender of uplands communities. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Portrait of Liu Yongfu, Liu Yongfu Museum, Qinzhou, PRC. Photo taken by the 
author. 
 
Flag Armies at War: Negotiating State Power in the Borderlands 
 As Kergaradec cast the Black Flags as enemies of commerce and exploration, Liu 
Yongfu took advantage of his army’s official connection to the Vietnamese state to wage war 
against his rivals. The Black Flags and the Yellow Flags, another group of failed rebels from 
southern China, fought violently for control of territory, populations, and resources throughout 
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the late 1860s and 1870s. This conflict raged in the uplands and valleys of the China-Vietnam 
borderlands as the two rebel groups competed for control of the opium trade as well as for a role 
in mining, a state monopoly activity in northern Vietnam. The war between the Black and 
Yellow Flags invited speculation about French intervention, providing, according to Kergaradec, 
further evidence for the necessity of colonial rule. 
Prior to their negotiations with Kergaradec, the Black Flags’ victory over Garnier in 1873 
had earned them the respect of the Vietnamese state. Liu Yongfu received a promotion to “Vice 
Military Commander” and a significant monetary reward from the Nguyễn court in Huế 
(ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:27).12 As they gained the support of powerful officials, the Black Flags 
sought to consolidate their power in northern Vietnam and openly fought against the Yellow 
Flags.13 
 After Liu Yongfu’s official promotion, the Black Flags became allied with two 
Vietnamese officials who held considerable regional power. Hoàng Kế Viêm, who would remain 
closely associated with the Black Flags throughout the nineteenth century, served as governor-
general of Sơn-Hưng-Tuyên (a region that combined Sơn Tây, Hưng Hoá and Tuyên Quang 
provinces) in the northwest, which included the lucrative trading port of Lào Cai. The second 
official, Tôn Thất Thuyết, served as governor and counselor for military affairs in Sơn Tây, 
along the Red River northwest of Hanoi (ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:38).14 These two officials escalated 
the campaign against the Yellow Flags, aiding Liu Yongfu in the process. In early 1874, they 
chased the Yellow Flags from Tuyên Quang, a province that, at the time, bordered southern 
China to the north. In recognition of this accomplishment, the Privy Council, a central 
government office at the Nguyễn capital of Huế, emphasized the need to either gain the awed 
submission of the Yellow Flags or carry out their swift and thorough elimination (ĐNTLCB 
1976, 33:40–41). 
 The urgency of the Privy Council stemmed from the relative resurgence of the Yellow 
Flags in the upheaval surrounding Garnier’s coup and subsequent defeat. To subdue the Yellow 
Flags, the Privy Council briefly considered sending requests both to China and, strangely, the 
French military stationed in Hanoi (ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:40–41). The issue of Chinese assistance 
created controversy. While authorities in Huế deliberated, attacks by the Yellow Flags triggered 
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a minor rebellion in Cao Bằng province, as members of uplands populations blocked salt and rice 
shipments in borderland areas close to Guangxi.15 In response, the Cao Bằng administration 
requested permission from Huế to have Chinese cannons transferred to Cao Bằng from Guangxi, 
an action that would have involved the cooperation of the Qing Empire and provincial Guangxi 
officials. However, Huế denied their request, signaling a desire to defeat the Yellow Flags 
without the assistance of China.16 
 Allies in the Vietnamese state helped the Black Flags gain ground against their rivals. In 
August, Tôn Thất Thuyết, the Sơn Tây governor, reported to Huế that Nguyễn soldiers, who 
came from as far away as the central Vietnamese coast, had defeated the Yellow Flags as they 
raided villages in Sơn Tây (ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:53).17 The Nguyễn military pursued the Yellow 
Flags into the north, driving them into the Black Flag stronghold of Hưng Hóa, south of Lào Cai 
on the Red River (ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:81) (figure 5). In September, the Yellow Flags’ leader, Pan 
Lunsi, offered his surrender.18 The court, unimpressed, ordered local authorities to work with Liu 
Yongfu and capture Pan Lunsi as quickly as possible.19 
 
 
Figure 5. Red River in Hưng Hóa, Lao Cai Provincial Museum. Photo taken by the author. 
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 During the campaign against Pan Lunsi, tax funds in Tuyên Quang, formerly a reliable 
source of revenue, dwindled.20 Faced with financial devastation, the government in Huế 
approved a drastic reorganization of northern Vietnam’s political geography that benefitted the 
Black Flags and their allies. At the urging of Governor-General Hoàng Kế Viêm, the court 
approved the creation of four “routes” that would comprise jurisdictions of four separate military 
commanders. The reorganization put Liu Yongfu in charge of the route of Hưng Hóa 
(coterminous with Hưng Hóa province) and three other officials in charge of similarly delimited 
areas.21 The acceptance of this proposal expanded the official power of the Black Flags. It also 
resulted in the consolidation of military authority in the hands of four regional officials. After the 
Garnier coup, the Vietnamese state reacted to the Yellow Flags with a form of military rule that 
recalled the military protectorate system of the early nineteenth century.22 
While reliance on surrendered rebels and the co-optation of bandits might indicate the 
weakness of the Nguyễn state, the projection of state power through rebels and bandits, 
incorporated as power brokers, also meant something else. Since the 1830s, the Huế court had 
pursued the reorganization of Vietnamese territory into units called “provinces.” Staffed by civil 
officials, these provinces replaced the larger, more military-oriented forms of administration that 
characterized Nguyễn power in the early nineteenth century, following the Nguyễn victory over 
the Tây Sơn (Woodside 1988, 112–168). In the 1870s, the ideal of provincial reform gave way to 
the endorsement of a more direct mode of power. Factions within the Nguyễn Vietnam state, 
divided between advocates for the provincial vision and supporters of the Black Flags, disagreed 
over the appropriateness of hiring former outlaws. The question of the political weakness and 
ineptitude of the Nguyễn state motivated factional divisions in Vietnam as well as the views of 
the French consular authorities. However, rather than being a sign of weakness, the co-optation 
of power brokers by the Vietnamese state demonstrated one approach to administration, an 
approach that sacrificed the ideals of administrative reform for the reality of borderlands 
pragmatism. 
 Although the reorganization of administrative responsibilities in northern Vietnam 
facilitated direct action against the Yellow Flags, officials in Huế offered a qualified dissent to 
Liu Yongfu’s new status. In January 1875, the Privy Council observed that Liu’s official position 
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came with responsibilities; the Black Flags’ leader had to follow the mandates of the court as 
well as his immediate superiors. The Privy Council complained that Liu’s primary objective, in 
defiance of orders to patrol Tuyên Quang and all of Hưng Hóa province, remained the Black 
Flags’ dominance along the upper Red River. Concerned that French-sponsored merchants 
would encounter the Black Flags, the council ordered Liu Yongfu to concentrate on the 
extermination of Pan Lunsi, an assignment that would take him far from the trading port of Lào 
Cai (ĐNTLCB 1976, 33:141). 
 In January 1875, as the Privy Council criticized Liu Yongfu, the Yellow Flags returned to 
attack Tuyên Quang, an event that drew China into the conflict. This time, uplands militia drove 
them out.23 From Huế, the Ministry of Military responded to the news by authorizing anyone 
who captured Pan Lunsi to summarily execute him.24 Within months, the Qing Grand Council in 
Beijing identified the Yellow Flags as a grave threat to China; not only did Pan Lunsi maintain 
contact with the French, he also threatened to disturb the volatile China-Vietnam borderlands.25 
In March, after the Yellow Flags humiliated the provincial administrations of Bắc Ninh and Thái 
Nguyên, Huế assigned Tôn Thất Thuyết to work with the Qing military to weed them out.26 For 
Vietnam, assistance from China had become a necessity. 
 The defeat of Pan Lunsi, and victory for the Black Flags, was a coordinated effort. Qing 
armies, led by the future rebel Li Yangcai, flushed most of the Yellow Flags from Thái Nguyên 
as the Black Flags and Nguyễn soldiers awaited them at Pan’s old base area in Hà Dương, across 
the Red River from the Black Flag base at Lào Cai.27 When the Yellow Flags sought refuge at 
Hà Dương, they were ambushed. The war with the Yellow Flags ended with Pan Lunsi quartered 
and decapitated in the fields around his former stronghold (Huang 1936, 249).28 
 However, the cooperative victory over the Yellow Flags exacted some severe costs in 
northern Vietnam. In December, Tôn Thất Thuyết reported that residents displaced by Chinese 
military operations resisted returning to their former villages.29 The demographic consequences 
of cooperative counterinsurgency meant a lasting dislocation for local communities caught 
between the Yellow Flags and their enemies, who included the Chinese and Vietnamese 
militaries as well as the Black Flags. According to oral traditions in the area west of Hanoi, 
residents openly taunted the leader of the Black Flags: “The Black Flags call themselves ‘a 
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righteous army,’ yet take whatever they see for themselves. Liu Yongfu cares about wealth, and 
his underlings murder as they wish” (Nguyễn 1941, 17). 
 After the defeat of Pan Lunsi, Hoàng Kế Viêm tried to mollify the Black Flags’ 
detractors. He encouraged Liu and his lieutenants to lead their followers in cultivating land 
around Lào Cai, which would have bound them to one location.30 Similar to policies enacted 
decades earlier, the court, with Hoàng Kế Viêm’s assistance, hoped to bring sparsely populated 
regions under sedentary cultivation, thus ensuring a reliable tax base.31 In the context of 
Kergaradec’s demands for free passage along the Red River, resettling the Black Flags to a 
location far from Hanoi would have also soothed tensions with France. However, this plan failed, 
because of both the lack of agricultural experience among certain Black Flags and the pervasive 
mistrust of Liu’s army by the local population.32 
 Lào Cai, the lucrative river port controlled by the Black Flags, continued to provide a 
point of conflict for the court, inspiring the opinion of an official with a personal history tied to 
France.33 After Hoàng Kế Viêm informed Huế that Liu Yongfu refused to leave Lào Cai, 
officials in Huế became alarmed. In June 1877, Phạm Phú Thứ demanded that Hoàng Kế Viêm 
inform the Foreign Office, which handled correspondence between Nguyễn Vietnam and foreign 
governments (such as France’s), of any contact between Liu and French merchants or consulate 
officials.34 An official in the central bureaucracy, Phạm Phú Thứ had assisted Phan Thanh Giản 
in negotiating the Treaty of Saigon of 1862, which ceded the three eastern provinces (out of six) 
in southern Vietnam to France. In 1864, after accompanying Phan Thanh Giản to France in a 
fruitless attempt to regain partial control over the expanding French colony in the south, Phạm 
Phú Thứ returned to official life, advocating direct negotiation with France to avoid future 
conflicts (Ngô 1993, 802–803).35 Phạm Phú Thứ’s orders to Hoàng Kế Viêm about the Black 
Flags reflected his sense of cautious stewardship for the changing relationship between Vietnam 
and France. 
 While one faction at the court favored cultivating ties with France, the situation in the 
provinces increasingly demanded a pragmatic approach from Nguyễn officials. Agents of 
Vietnamese authority began to rely on the assistance of uplands communities in their campaigns 
against borderland bandits. In Cao Bằng province, to the east of Lào Cai, uplands militias 
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defeated a band led by Ông Thất, who then fled south and surrendered to the governor-general of 
Ninh-Thái in 1877.36 However, just as the Ministry of Military in Huế responded to Ông Thất’s 
surrender, the supposedly pliant bandit returned to Cao Bằng, where he raided villages in search 
of food.37 According to Nguyễn Đình Nhuận, the Cao Bằng governor, militias in the uplands, 
mostly from Tai communities, again drove away Ông Thất, chasing him into hiding and 
defending their communities from pillage.38 In October, he fled south once more, this time to 
Thái Nguyên, where he connected with followers of a Chinese bandit named Liu Zhiping.39 
Nguyễn officials lost track of Ông Thất for the next two years.40 He reemerged in January 1880, 
when, together with Liu Zhiping, Ông Thất led a series of raids into uplands communities, 
including some reportedly containing Catholic converts in southern Guangxi.41 The complex 
personal networks that sustained armed groups, in the case of the uplands of Cao Bằng, often 
yielded more readily to the strength of Tai militias than to the authority of the Nguyễn state. 
 As militias defended the uplands, co-opted bandits and former rebels continued to 
prosper under a Nguyễn state increasingly concerned with projecting its authority through power 
brokers. For the Black Flags’ leader, Liu Yongfu, victory over the Yellow Flags proved 
lucrative. In February 1878, he began receiving salary and supplies directly from Huế on a 
monthly basis. For the over fourteen hundred registered members of his personal militia, the 
Ministry of Revenue granted the following: 
 
Table 1. Liu Yongfu’s monthly allowance, circa 1878. 
 
Copper cash (quan) Rice (mỳ) Salt (diêm) 
30,842 tiền 19,021 phương 570 phương 
 
          Source: Hưng Hóa Provincial Governor Nguyễn Huy Kỷ to Ministry of Population (Bộ Lễ), 
         12/12/TĐ30. File No: 186:294, CBTN. 
 
 
Later that year, the Grand Secretariat, another central office of the Vietnamese state, awarded 
Liu Yongfu a special dispensation on the occasion of the fiftieth year of the Tự Đức Emperor’s 
reign. He received a Phi Long payment—issued by the court to mark special events and 
recognize meritorious service to the state (Lê and Nguyễn 2002)—of 30 quan gold, 
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recommended by Bùi Văn Dị and authorized by the emperor.42 The court now fully embraced 
Liu Yongfu, referred to as the “Vice Military Commander of Tam Tuyên.”43 
 This embrace, however, came with certain obligations that the court struggled to impose. 
Attempts to control Liu Yongfu’s involvement with the trade in natural resources, particularly 
precious metals, exposed the frustrations of certain provincial officials. Soon after Liu’s Phi 
Long dispensation, Nguyễn Huy Kỷ, the Hưng Hóa governor, informed the Ministry of Revenue, 
which managed issues of taxation from Huế, of Liu’s recent commercial activities. The Black 
Flags’ leader had purchased two state monopoly goods, copper and lead, from merchants in Lào 
Cai without seeking prior permission from the provincial authorities. The ministry responded 
that Liu should compensate the province for copper and lead according to the market rate, which 
Liu then refused to do.44 Further evidence of the compelling ability of the Black Flags to ignore 
official discipline emerged in March 1878, when Liu’s army raided peaceable settlements in the 
mountains of northern Hưng Hóa. Governor Nguyễn Huy Kỷ, who had earlier complained about 
mishandled mineral resources, now reassured the Privy Council that he could prevent future 
transgressions by Liu Yongfu.45 The behavior of the Black Flags seemingly defied the control of 
central and provincial authorities alike. 
Meanwhile, factions within the Nguyễn state began to develop a case against the Black 
Flags based on maintaining peaceful relations with France. Trần Đình Túc, one of the negotiators 
of the Philastre Treaty and, like Phạm Phú Thứ, an opponent of the Black Flags’ incorporation 
into the Vietnamese state, pressed Hoàng Kế Viêm, through appeals to the Privy Council, for a 
full report of Liu’s activities, citing heightened tensions between the Black Flags and 
Kergaradec. Liu Yongfu, Trần Đình Túc contended, had to understand that the lingering 
animosity between the French and the Black Flags could seriously damage the already tense 
situation in northern Vietnam.46 Hoàng Kế Viêm assured the court that Liu would comply and 
said that, as the Black Flags’ liaison, he would personally complete the investigation.47 
Nonetheless, the division separating pro–Black Flags officials and opponents of Liu Yongfu 
began to deepen. At the end of the 1870s, with Pan Lunsi defeated, the Yellow Flags weakened, 
and Liu Yongfu fully integrated into the Vietnamese bureaucracy, the Vietnamese court 
maintained a delicate extension of Nguyễn authority in Hưng Hoá through the Black Flags. As 
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Liu Yongfu kept a loose connection to the discipline of official life, Nguyễn officials formed 
factions around the Black Flags. Those supporting the incorporation of the Black Flags opposed 
others who advocated protecting Vietnamese relations with France. 
In this disagreement over statecraft and alliances, the question of French interests became 
almost a secondary element for Nguyễn officials. For the French officials at the consulate, 
however, the projection of Nguyễn power into the borderlands through the Black Flags was a 
picture of chaos, inefficiency, and disorder, a situation that, in their view, demanded French 
intervention. According to Nguyễn documentation acquired by the Hanoi consulate (and 
forwarded to Saigon), as late as 1881 the local administration of Hưng Hóa had to remind 
transporters of food provisions to present their paperwork first to the Vietnamese authorities, 
even if those porters delivered to the Black Flags.48 In areas under Liu Yongfu’s control, the state 
seemed secondary to the borderland power brokers it employed. 
 
The Li Yangcai Rebellion: A Consular View of Borderlands Counterinsurgency 
As a case of cooperation across the borderlands, the involvement of Qing officials in the 
war against the Yellow Flags confirmed the durability of the relationship between China and 
Nguyễn Vietnam during the hectic decade of the 1870s. Despite its counterinsurgency intentions, 
Qing assistance in northern Vietnam also provided an opportunity for a translocal rebellion. 
When China helped the Black Flags, themselves once rebels against the Qing, to vanquish the 
Yellow Flags, borderlands counterinsurgency generated a fresh threat to Vietnam and, by 
extension, to China itself. When a veteran of the anti–Yellow Flags campaign returned to 
Vietnam to launch a rebellion against the Nguyễn, the second of the decade, the delicate 
arrangement that sustained Nguyễn authority in the borderlands survived. In French consular 
eyes, however, the ultimate defeat of this new rebellion merely evinced the necessity of a French 
military intervention. 
In September 1878, Li Yangcai, who had recently commanded Qing armies against the 
Yellow Flags, rebelled against the Nguyễn (and, by extension, against China).49 The previous 
summer, Li had made initial forays into Nguyễn territory to gather intelligence (ĐNTLCB 1976, 
34:121). From his home in Qinzhou, on China’s southern coast, Li recruited a few thousand 
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followers and announced his intention to overthrow the Nguyễn dynasty, which had ruled 
Vietnam since 1802. In its place, he planned to reestablish the Lý dynasty, which had vanished 
from political power six centuries earlier.50 From the bordering Chinese province of Guangdong, 
Li crossed into Nguyễn territory in Lạng Sơn, seizing control of lucrative market centers in the 
province.51 
 Provincial authorities in Vietnam and China coordinated their response to Li Yangcai’s 
insurgency. Within days of Li’s attack on Lạng Sơn, the governor of Guangxi in China provided 
the governor of Lạng Sơn and Cao Bằng in Vietnam with information about the size of Li’s 
personal army and his last known whereabouts.52 Vietnamese authorities then pushed the Lý 
pretender deep into the mountains of southern Lạng Sơn.53 To assist in the hunt for Li Yangcai, 
the Guangxi governor recommended that Feng Zicai, who had recent experience hunting bandits 
in Vietnam, assist the Vietnamese military.54 Over the next two months, Feng and several 
thousand soldiers from Guangxi helped drive Li Yangcai and his followers even further south 
into Bắc Ninh and Thái Nguyên (ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:171, 181). As he fled, Li commanded his 
followers to loot markets along the way, securing resources by force (ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:181–
182). 
 Some of Li’s victims began reporting his activities to the Vietnamese authorities. On 
December 16, 1878, the court in Huế received a communication from Xie Pangping, who 
identified himself as an “An Nam Đông Kinh Thương Khách” (trader in Annam’s eastern 
capital, Hanoi) and an “An Nam Bắc Ninh Thương Khách” (trader in Annam’s Bắc Ninh 
province). In his report, Xie claims that Li Yangcai’s band had dwindled to half its original size 
as a result of defeat, starvation, and illness.55 In this unusual piece of paperwork, Xie Pangping 
indicates that he knew details about Li Yangcai, including Li’s home area of Qinzhou in southern 
China. Despite Xie’s apparent familiarity with the needs of the Vietnamese court, however, his 
use of the term “Annam” (C: Annan) for Vietnam reveals a lack of rhetorical decorum. 
Information flowing from more informal channels illustrated a degree of terminological 
flexibility otherwise prevented by the norms of official discourse, according to which “Vietnam” 
(C: Yuenan) had become the official term for the country in Qing correspondence during the first 
decade of the nineteenth century. 
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 As the Nguyễn authorities coordinated with Qing officials and relied on intelligence 
reports from foreign merchants, the campaign against Li Yangcai attracted the attention of 
France. On November 7, 1878, an official at the French Legation in Beijing, Gabriel Devéria, 
supplied Louis Lafont, the governor of French Cochinchina, with the transcript of a conversation 
between Devéria and a member of the Qing Grand Council.56 In the transcript, Devéria initially 
asked about a “Guangxi insurrection,” to which the Qing official replied that he knew nothing 
about a rebellion in Guangxi province. Once Devéria mentioned Li Yangcai, the Qing official 
outlined the cooperative effort involving the Nguyễn government, even citing the campaigns 
against other Chinese bandits ten years earlier as a precedent.57 When another French Legation 
official contacted a Qing official in Guangxi about the possibility of French assistance later that 
month, the reply clearly stated that any such proposals to send foreign soldiers to Vietnam must 
pass through the Huế court.58 
 French officials in Saigon, in contrast to Devéria in Beijing, had another source for 
information about Li Yangcai: the Hanoi consulate. In December, the same month that Xie 
Pangping reported on the weakened state of Li Yangcai’s forces, a military officer attached to the 
Hanoi consulate filed a detailed account of their raids in Bắc Ninh and Thái Nguyên. This report 
told of Li’s claim to overthrow the Nguyễn and reestablish the Lý, providing a far more complete 
picture of the rebellion than reports from the French legation in China.59 
 Into 1879, Li Yangcai and the campaign against him created a fertile atmosphere for the 
revival of unrelated and long-dormant rebellions. In the wake of Li’s uprising, the Yellow Flag 
lieutenant Gao Shi’er occupied villages in Hưng Hóa (ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:213). In Tuyên Quang, 
uplanders formerly tied to the White Flags, a rebellion from the 1860s connected to the 
borderland opium trade, renewed raids of lowland villages (ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:215).60 In Thái 
Nguyên, Liu Zhiping, the former ally of Ông Thất who had submitted to Nguyễn authority, 
renounced his loyalty to the Nguyễn and joined Li’s rebellion.61 Also in Thái Nguyên, two 
unknown thieves identified as Lý Lục and Lý Thất ransacked lowland villages throughout the 
summer of 1879. After tracking Lý Lục and Lý Thất into the mountains, Nông Đức Đàng, a local 
Tai leader in northern Thái Nguyên, reported their arrest to the provincial authorities, noting that 
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they had declared loyalty to Li Yangcai.62 Li’s rebellion was a mandala-like expression of power, 
attracting alliances throughout the northern borderlands of Vietnam. 
 As reports from the Qing and Nguyễn bureaucracies generated conflicting evidence about 
the strength and popularity of Li’s rebellion, the French consulate in Hanoi continued to serve as 
a base for intelligence work. In April 1879, Kergaradec dispatched Giorgios Vlavianos, a former 
colleague of the French gun merchant Jean Dupuis and a consulate employee, to Thái Nguyên. 
Once there, Vlavianos claimed that he was graciously offered a meeting with Feng Zicai, the 
Qing official who was hunting Li Yangcai. In his report of this meeting, Vlavianos described the 
armaments used by the Qing and Nguyễn, which he judged to be in a dilapidated condition and 
of poor quality.63 Feng’s tactic to defeat Li by trapping him in the mountains was proving 
difficult to realize. Military rice convoys, which transported food to Feng’s soldiers, became 
targets for uplanders who were, like the Lý brothers in Thái Nguyên, sympathetic to the 
rebellion. Li Yangcai, despite Feng’s best efforts, was able to maintain a modest supply line for 
food.64 
 Upon his return to Hanoi, Vlavianos supplied the consulate with a letter from Feng Zicai 
warning against future voyages by French travelers, merchants, or agents. In the letter, Feng 
cautioned the Hanoi consulate that Liu Yongfu and the Black Flags would kill anyone they did 
not recognize.65 Heeding this ominous warning, Kergaradec commissioned no further 
expeditions, although he continued to update the governor of Cochinchina with news of Li’s 
rebellion.66 
 In his correspondence with Lafont, Kergaradec developed a depiction of the campaign 
against Li Yangcai that emphasized the long-term threat posed by China and the Black Flags to 
French interests.67 He claimed, in all likelihood falsely, to have secured Feng Zicai’s assistance 
with the gradual exit of the Black Flags from areas near the Red River, thus removing a barrier to 
French control of trade in northern Vietnam.68 The Black Flags, once the object of diplomatic 
overtures, became a potentially lethal threat to French interests. Kergaradec noted that, with the 
assistance of sympathetic Nguyễn officials such as Hoàng Kế Viêm, the Black Flags were 
training civilian militia in Sơn Tây, just west of Hanoi. Besides the obvious military dangers they 
presented, Kergaradec argued, the Black Flags also interfered with the establishment of a 
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borderlands customs service, a key provision of the 1874 treaty and a personal priority of 
Kergaradec.69 
 Advocates of French interests operated outside the consulate as well. Although 
Kergaradec envisioned an alliance between France and uplanders, an early ally of the consulate 
emerged from within the Nguyễn bureaucracy. Nguyễn Hữu Độ, the governor of Hanoi province, 
suggested that all Qing soldiers return to China as soon as possible. Li’s rebellion, he argued, did 
not pose a significant threat to Vietnam. Moreover, a long-term Chinese military presence would 
irrevocably harm the population (ĐNTLCB 1976, 34:239–241). Although the court rejected 
Nguyễn Hữu Độ’s proposal, his position placed him into a camp of Nguyễn officials opposed to 
the Black Flags.70 Nguyễn Hữu Độ, who would become a powerful official under the French 
protectorate after 1883, also boasted about defeating bandits without Chinese assistance, which 
demonstrated, to his satisfaction, the nonessential quality of Qing involvement (Sogny 1924, 
187). The symmetry between the agenda of this rather controversial official, recently described 
by the historian Đặng Phong as an “enthusiastic servant” of French interests in Vietnam, and that 
of the Hanoi consulate had a basis in their shared hostility toward Chinese military assistance 
(Đặng 2010, 89). 
 After leading a thirteen-month rebellion in northern Vietnam, Li Yangcai was finally 
captured in late October 1879. According to Feng Zicai, local militia in Thái Nguyên assisted in 
a simultaneous strike against Li and his followers. After he took Li alive, Feng reported that most 
of the rebel’s followers either starved in the mountains or drowned in the surrounding lake as 
they fled.71 Kergaradec excitedly relayed news of Li’s capture to Lafont in Saigon, speculating 
the eminent return of all Qing soldiers to China.72 After his return to Guangxi as a prisoner of 
China, Li Yangcai was decapitated. To prevent the continuance or reappearance of his rebellion, 
the Qing Grand Council, on the advice of authorities in Guangxi, allowed the Nguyễn officials in 
Thái Nguyên and Lạng Sơn to display Li’s head as a graphic warning.73 Li’s head became a 
visceral reminder of Vietnamese sovereignty. 
 For Kergaradec, the execution of Li Yangcai did little to resolve the obstacles to French 
interests that he saw throughout northern Vietnam. Smaller groups of Chinese bandits that had 
forged connections with Li during his brief uprising remained.74 Those that evaded capture 
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remained hidden in the mountains of Thái Nguyên and Tuyên Quang.75 Viewed through the 
consular optic, the limited suppression of banditry by the Nguyễn and uplands militias 
established to defend communities were substantial threats. Not only did small groups of bandits 
threaten the safety of expeditions, Kergaradec also believed that the Vietnamese state would take 
the existence of these bands as a pretext for blocking the commercial development of northern 
Vietnam.76 Furthermore, there was still the issue of the Black Flags. When the bulk of Liu 
Yongfu’s army returned to Lào Cai in January 1880, Kergaradec reiterated his worries about 
their disruptive effects on commerce.77 The following summer, when a French merchant ship 
encountered problems during a voyage from Hanoi to Lào Cai, Kergaradec blamed the Black 
Flags.78 The increased level of observation afforded by the consulate in effect provided 
Kergaradec with numerous opportunities to discover the enduring threats to French interests in 
northern Vietnam. 
 
Conclusion 
 The execution of Li Yangcai in October 1879 brought the last rebellion of the 1870s to a 
close. Li had used his military experience and knowledge of the China-Vietnam borderlands to 
launch a coup against the Nguyễn state in northern Vietnam. From the Hanoi consulate, 
representatives of France monitored Li’s rebellion just as they had monitored other events in the 
borderlands since 1874. The consular optics—the particular way of seeing supported by the 
production of intelligence about Vietnam, its borderlands, and its relationship to the Qing 
Empire—enabled the development of a case for French intervention, for the extension of French 
colonial rule into northern Nguyễn Vietnam. 
 The identification and defense of French interests and the surveillance of Vietnamese 
counterinsurgency flowed from the establishment of consular offices. Kergaradec’s reports 
endorsed a picture of disorder, a refracted vision of the borderlands composed to complement the 
interests of those advocating colonial rule. Kergaradec’s charge of disorderliness cloaked what 
he was really thinking of—namely, the introduction of an ordering, commercially attuned, and 
development-inducing French colonial authority. For Kergaradec, the civilizing influence of 
future French rule would replace the weakened and venal Vietnamese state. However, his 
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portrayal of the political arrangements that extendedNguyễn power into remote areas of the 
country, albeit delicately, occluded the factions, actors, and competition over resources that 
characterized Vietnam in the 1870s. 
 With the arrival of the Black and Yellow Flags from southern China in the 1860s, 
sponsorship of old rebels as new power brokers became the dominant, yet divisive, strategy for 
the maintenance of Nguyễn rule in northern Vietnam. Although factions formed on either side of 
the issue, the employment of Black Flags as officials enabled the Vietnamese state to claim 
authority in areas otherwise beyond its administrative reach. For the Black Flags themselves, co-
optation by the Nguyễn state brought sponsorship and a loose attachment to the rigors of official 
discipline. Their war with the Yellow Flags continued across the borderlands of China and 
Vietnam, eventually drawing the Qing Empire, former enemies of the Black Flags, into the 
conflict. 
 The establishment of French consular offices, which produced intelligence about the 
borderlands and facilitated a failed French attempt to broker a deal with the Black Flags for Lào 
Cai, further complicated the relationship between Nguyễn Vietnam and the Qing Empire. The 
formal relationship between these two countries became an object of suspicion and distrust not 
only for those defending French interests but for some officials within the Vietnamese state as 
well. In the decade before the Sino-French War, which formally ended the framework of the 
“tributary” relationship between Nguyễn Vietnam and the Qing Empire, deep rifts within the 
Nguyễn state over its employment of the Black Flags began to form against the backdrop of the 
changing French role in northern Vietnam. 
 In the 1980s, the historian Truong Buu Lam wrote: 
Once past the admittedly unique act of invasion, foreign attackers typically 
become enmeshed in the intricacies of internal struggles that pit resisters against 
collaborators, and one breed of resisters against another. The role of the invaders 
subsequently begins to look very much like that of any other faction embroiled in 
a civil strife. (Lam 1984, vii–viii) 
 
Although the establishment of consulate offices hardly resembled an “invasion,” the changing 
French diplomatic presence in Vietnam, a symptom of broader changes in the nineteenth century 
for both Vietnam and the Qing Empire, demonstrated the subtle power of “factions.” As 
Davis 82 
  
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 11 (June 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-11) 
 
 
Kergaradec found allies in officials such as Phạm Phú Thư, other Nguyễn officials, such as 
Nguyễn Hữu Độ (figure 6) began seeing the concerns of the French consulate as a useful tool for 
furthering their own factional interests. 
 
 
Figure 6. Nguyễn Hữu Độ, between 1876 and 1879. Photograph by Émile Gsell. Source: 
Ghesquière (2001, 226). 
 
 Nguyễn Hữu Độ’s concerns exemplified the usefulness of France to the anti–Black Flag 
faction in Vietnam. On October 19, 1880, in a report to the Privy Council and the Office of 
Foreign Affairs in Huế, he identified two chief problems that the court must resolve in order to 
secure good relations with France. First, the court must break the Black Flags’ monopoly over 
commerce in Lào Cai. Second, tax administration, especially in the China-Vietnam borderlands, 
suffered from an endemic corruption that must be eliminated.79 The first problem spoke directly 
to the failed attempt by Kergaradec to secure Lào Cai, the lucrative river port held by the Black 
Flags, through clandestine negotiations in Hanoi. In 1880, just two years after the beginning of 
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the Sino-French War, Nguyễn Hữu Độ made a case for dismissing the Black Flags from the 
official ranks of the Vietnamese state, thereby opening the Red River to commerce. His second 
concern, the endemic corruption of borderlands tax administration, obliquely criticized the Black 
Flags. As the 1870s gave way to the 1880s, factional struggles over the employment of the Black 
Flags began to correspond with the concerns of French consular officials. The changing French 
consular presence, and its particular way of seeing the borderlands, had become “embroiled” in a 
particular form of “civil strife.” 
 
Bradley Camp Davis is an assistant professor of history at Eastern Connecticut State University. 
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7 Also identified as Hoàng Tài Gia. The Huế court's knowledge of this meeting came from 
Hoàng Kế Viêm. Trần Đình Túc, the highest-ranking official in Hanoi province, did not 
Davis 84 
  
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 11 (June 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-11) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
attend. Fearing French grievances against Liu, the Nguyễn Foreign Office ordered the 
provincial government in Hanoi to notify Liu, through Hoàng Kế Viêm, that he must act 
carefully to not provoke the French consulate.  
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13 Another armed group from southern China formerly linked to a rebellion against the Qing 
Empire, the Yellow Flags were led by Pan Lunsi. Also known as Huang Chongying 
(Hoàng Sùng Anh), Pan Lunsi assumed command of the Yellow Flags upon the death of 
the group’s founder, Wu Yazhong. Liu Yongfu, the leader of the Nguyễn-allied Black 
Flags, had a long association with Wu Yazhong and Pan Lunsi. All three had joined the 
rebellion of the Yanling Kingdom in southern Guangxi, a rebellion led by Wu Yazhong’s 
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the Black Flags out of China and into Vietnam, Pan Lunsi and Wu Yazhong led the 
Yellow Flags in pursuit. After the defeat of Wu Yazhong in 1869, only Pan Lunsi 
remained, fighting a war against both the Black Flags and their Nguyễn allies. For more 
on these events, see Davis (2008b). 
14 Tôn Thất Thuyết would later lead the Cần Vương royalist movement against the French 
protectorate in 1886. After the collapse of the Cần Vương in the late 1880s, Tôn Thất 
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15 Cao Bằng Provincial Governor Lương Tuấn Tú to Grand Secretariat (C: Neige, V:.nội 
các), eighth day, fourth month, twenty-seventh year of the Tự Đức Reign (hereafter 
day/month/TĐ#), File No: 316:257, Châu Bản Triều Nguyễn (hereafter CBTN). 
16 Cao Bằng Provincial Governor Lương Tuấn Tú to Grand Secretariat, 8/4/TĐ27, File No: 
316:257, CBTN. The Grand Secretariat and the Ministry of Military (C: Bing Bu, V: Bộ 
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central institutions such as the Grand Secretariat and the Privy Council handled policy 
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17 Tôn Thất Thuyết to Privy Council, 18/7/TĐ27, File No: 212:262, CBTN. Tôn Thất 
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23 Tuyên Quang Provincial Governor Mai Quý to Ministry of Military, 15/12/TĐ27, File 
No: 58:268, CBTN. 
24 Rescript to Mai Quý, 17/12/TĐ27, File No: 58:268, CBTN. 
25 Grand Council, June 15, 1875, in Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiuhui 
(Academica Sinica Modern History Research Group, hereafter Academica Sinica), 
document 8, p. 18; Cen Yuying to Grand Council, August 8, 1875, in Academica Sinica, 
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26 Grand Secretariat (Bùi Văn Dị, Lê Tiến Thông, Nguyễn Thuật) to Court, 13/2/TĐ28. File 
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28 Huang Haian recorded Liu’s personal oral history in a series of conversations at the end 
of the Black Flag leader’s life. 
29 Tôn Thất Thuyết, Lê Hưu Tạ, and Hà Văn Quân to Trần Tiễn Thành, with reports to 
Tuyên Quang Tỉnh Thần Mai Quý and Lã Xuân Oai, 9/11/TĐ28, File No: 203:271, 
CBTN. 
30 Ministry of Military to Hoàng Kế Viêm, 5/1/TĐ30, File No: 2:274, CBTN, which cites 
the 3/12/TĐ29 report from Mai (Thế) Quý to Ministry of Military.   
31 Ministry of Military to Hoàng Kế Viêm, 5/1/TĐ30, File No: 2:274, CBTN. Tạ Di Đình, 
Hoàng Kế Viêm's assistant, noted that no one in any of these areas believed that the 
Black Flags intended to establish a permanent settlement (C: liyi, V: lập ấp). 
32 Hoàng Kế Viêm to Court, 8/3/TĐ30, File No: 303:275, CBTN. The Huế court issued the 
directive during the tenth month of TĐ29.  
33 Hoàng Kế Viêm to Court, 8/3/TĐ30, File No: 303:275, CBTN.  
Davis 86 
  
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 
E-Journal No. 11 (June 2014) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-11) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
34 Hoàng Kế Viêm to Court, 7/5/TĐ30, with citation of Phạm Phú Thứ to Privy Council, 
24/4/TĐ30, File No: 303:275, CBTN.  
35 For more on Phan Thanh Giản, see Delvaux (1926) and Osborne (1970). 
36 Military Commander of Ninh-Thái Lê Hưu Tạ to Secretariat and Ministry of Military, 
12/8/TĐ30, File No: 35:286, CBTN.  
37 Hoàng Kế Viêm to Ministry of Military, 18/8/TĐ30, File No: 89:286, CBTN.  
38 Cao Bằng Provincial Official Nguyễn Đình Nhuận to Ministry of Military, 21/8/TĐ30, 
File No: 115:286, CBTN.  
39 Hoàng Kế Viêm to Ministry of Military, 20/8/TĐ30, and reply dated 27/8/TĐ30, File No: 
134:286, CBTN.  
40 Lê Hưu Tạ to Hoàng Kế Viêm, 25/8/TĐ30, File No: 112:289, CBTN.  
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58 “Révolte du Kouang Si et envahissement du Nord du Tonkin par les rebelles chinois 
commandés par Ly-Yung-Choi, 1878 à 1879,” November 7, 1878, File No: 11932 
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70 Nguyễn Hữu Độ’s personal history and official career have a great deal of relevance for 
the history of the Tonkin protectorate. For more on Nguyễn Hữu Độ, see Sogny (1924), 
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